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Abstract 
 
Since mid-nineties, India’s foreign exchange reserves (FER) – both nominal and 
real adjusted for price level – started growing considerably and reached a new peak of 
US$ 251985 million in 2008-09. The fact that such unprecedented accumulation of FER 
build-up has materialized despite India's balance of payment on its current account being 
mostly negative, has raised debates on the major potential challenges for Indian 
Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF), in case they come to existence. Using the two measures 
of reserve adequacy - the ratio of reserves to short-term external debt and ratio of reserves 
to broad money – the study indicates “too much” of reserves build-up for the Indian 
economy particularly since 2002, suggesting thereby that India has substantial amount of 
surplus reserves. Given the fact that India’s current account balance is worsening for the 
last couple of years, it could be noted that the increase in India’s FER has been caused by 
speculative capital inflows on the capital account. In other words, the reserve is very 
much exposed to potential sudden outflows by foreign investors and any decision should 
be taken keeping this perspective into account. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Despite increasing inclination towards market liberalization and privatization observed 
over the last decade, 5  the role of the States has in this period of time arguably grown in 
importance on some particular aspects of investment. Notably investments from emerging 
economies increased, a large proportion of which was executed by State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Both forms of investments originate from State ownership 
and State activity, and are thus regularly referred to as investments by “state-controlled entities” 
(SCEs).  
 
Investments through SWF route is not a recent phenomenon, but is in operation for 
around five decades. The purpose of SWFs is to invest surplus State reserves in foreign currency 
to yield profits. The funds improve the liquidity of the financial markets, create long term growth 
and jobs and ensure stability for the companies they invest in. These responsible and reliable 
investors have pursued a long-term, stable policy that has certainly stood the test during the recent 
turmoil in the financial markets.  
 
SOEs are particularly important in emerging and transition economies such as China, 
India, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Czech Republic and Russia. Many SOEs are listed among 
the Fortune Global 500 list. Chinese SOEs figure most frequently in this listing, making up for 24 
firms. Due to the significance of FDI by Chinese SOEs, their characteristics have been received 
particular attention (Gugler and Boie, 2009). Indeed, by far the largest outward investments by 
Chinese MNEs are made by SOEs, and all investment projects follow a scheme that ensures that 
they are strictly in line with government policies. The motivations of Chinese firms to 
internationalize and the government interest in this effort are to large extent aligned and 
institutionally intertwined. 
 
The current paper attempts to analyse the trends in SWF investment and the main 
obstacles they face with. In particular, the analysis focus on the major potential challenges for 
Indian SWF, in case they come to existence. The analysis is arranged along the following lines. 
First the global SWF experience is reviewed, followed by the possibility of creating an Indian 
SWFs. The subsequent analysis intends to identify the main regulations in the EU and the US 
market that Indian SWFs might face. These regulations might function as potential obstacles in 
                                                        
5  The recent economic crisis is however underlining the role to be played by the national Governments in 
no uncertain terms. 
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the sense that they incorporate conditions for any investment to enter their domestic markets. The 
analysis will then focus on the multilateral (IMF) guidelines on SWFs6, which apparently again 
might be perceived as an obstacle. However complying with these multilateral rules could be 
advantageous for Indian SWFs, if these regulations help them to avoid the EU and US obstacles 
to investment. On the basis of the analyses with respect to legal perspective, the policy 
conclusions on Indian investment strategies are drawn. 
 
2. Trends in Sovereign Investments in the world  
 
SWFs can be defined as pools of investment capital (whatever may be the legal form of 
the SWF: private or public) controlled by a government or central bank and invested in economic 
activities in other countries. The source of this capital is foreign exchange reserves, which all 
governments keep (typically in widely traded currencies such as the dollar, euro, or yen). When 
there is a surplus current account balance those reserves can be put into an investment fund and 
used to increase national wealth or diversify sources of revenue. 
 
Sovereign wealth funds have come into the spotlight, especially since 2007 when China 
declared its intention to invest USD 3 billion of its fund reserves in private holding companies. 
The SWFs have raised concerns about: financial stability, corporate governance, and political 
interference and protectionism7. Interestingly, it is observed that the funds for many Merger and 
Acquisition (M & A) transactions originate from potential geopolitical rivals. Currently SWFs 
and central banks with a large SWF function manage an estimated USD 3.2 trillion of assets.  
 
It is however important to put SWFs into perspective with other existing investment 
options. In 2006, by comparison, global stock market capitalisation was USD 42 trillion, while 
the market value of private debt securities was USD 23 billion. The importance of SWFs in global 
capital markets is expected to grow, mainly because of high oil prices, the relative weakness of 
the US dollar and persistent current account surpluses in China and certain other Asian countries 
(Blundell-Wignall et al, 2008: p. 6-7). The idea here is that a country can establish it’s SWF only 
                                                        
6   The IMF principles detailed below are not regulations in the strict sense of the term but rather they 
offer guidelines covering governance, accountability, transparency, and conduct of investments for 
SWFs. 
7  It should be borne in mind that SWFs usually lack structures that are transparent and management 
processes that are domestically and internationally accountable. They work in an opaque way. SWFs 
do not publish statistics on their composition and size or their investments and strategies. Another 
concern is that management of SWFS may be motivated by “nationalistic considerations” and not only 
made in search of investment opportunities that yield optimal risk-adjusted rates of return as suggested 
by classical economic theories (Chaisse and Gugler, 2010). 
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if it is having surplus foreign currency. Looking at the data on SWFs from Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Institute website, it is observed that the surplus is generated through two channels8. On one 
hand, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Norway, Russia etc. set up SWFs from their oil revenue. On 
the other hand, the SWFs of China, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand etc. depend on their non-
commodity export earnings.  
 
Morgan Stanley (2007) predicted that SWFs may manage USD 12 trillion by 2015 (Jen, 
2007). Global Insight announced in 2008 that SWFs have been growing by 24 per cent annually 
for the past three years.9 Projecting from this annual growth rate, Global Insight forecasted that 
SWFs will surpass the entire current economic output of the United States by 2015, and that of 
the European Union by 2016. In 2010, Preqin Special Report on Sovereign Wealth Funds 
gave an updated assessment of SWF growth. The start of a global economic recovery has 
helped the aggregate assets under management of all SWFs to reach $3.59 trillion, which 
represents a 11% increase from last year. The picture is striking: despite the global 
economic and financial crisis, SWFs have retained their influence (Preqin , 2010: p. 190). 
 
Because of the financial crisis, the US market remains an attractive option for the 
emerging economy SWFs (especially China), which is a matter of concern there, the most 
prominent being the fear of foreign government investment for the wrong reasons (threatening 
national security). The concerns expressed in the US are known and shared by the EU. Owing to 
the geographic proximity, however, Europeans are perhaps more concerned about Russia. This 
explains to some extent the different perceptions on the two sides of the Atlantic and the 
differences in terms of regulatory approach. 
 
Four issues are generally important in relation with SWFs. First, the role of investing 
governments is often called into question. Second, the lack of transparency of SWFs is another 
area of concern. Third, the alleged political motivations behind SWF operations constitute a 
major debate. Finally from a political economic standpoint, there is certainly a difficulty in 
developed countries in accepting a shift in the balance of power in the world economy to new 
emerging market giants (Lyons, 2008).  
 
                                                        
8  The data is obtained from Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, available at 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/funds.php (last accessed on August 16, 2009). 
9  The details can be obtained from http://www.globalinsight.com/ (last accessed on March 8, 2009).  
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3.   TOWARDS AN INDIAN SWF ? 
 
The idea of an Indian SWF was not conceivable in the eighties or the nineties, owing to 
the relatively low level of overall foreign exchange reserve (FER) of the country and the 
consistent adverse current account balance during that period. The overall level of FER was quite 
low and fluctuating in the eighties. Owing to this reason, investment outflow was never actively 
encouraged. The situation reached a particular low in 1989-90 with an FER of USD 3962 Million. 
FER scenario improved to some extent with increase in gold reserves next year, but the foreign 
currency asset holding declined, which offset the effect partially. The transition towards an 
outward-oriented economic policy was adopted subsequently, resulting to increase in FERs, but 
with a simultaneous decline in India’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) reserves since then. 
India’s FER scenario is shown below with the help of Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. India’s Nominal and Real Foreign Exchange Reserves from 1990-91 to 2008-09 
 
 
Source : Drawn with data obtained from RBI (2009 -10) 
 
Since mid-nineties as exhibited in Figure 1, India’s FER – both nominal and real adjusted 
for price level – started growing considerably, which reached a new peak in 2006-07 at USD 
199179 Million. India's foreign currency reserves are currently ranked World's fourth-largest. 
Besides, the level of exports increased considerably during late nineties and as a result during 
2001-02 to 2003-04, the country’s current account balance was in a surplus. Though in the 
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following period, India’s current account balance turned negative again, the capital account 
balance was always surplus in the new millennium, which helped the overall balance of payments 
to remain emphatically positive.  
 
It is worthwhile to note that during 2007-08 rupee has appreciated vis-à-vis the dollar by 
more than 10%  This increased the return earned in foreign exchange, when rupee assets are sold 
and the revenue converted into dollars. The investments turn even more attractive triggering an 
investment spiral. This availability of investible funds in the economy paved the way for outward 
investment opportunities and the government encouragement to the same should be interpreted in 
this background.  
 
Thus the overall picture is one of secular growth since 1990, interposed by a noticeable 
acceleration of Reserves buildup since 2002. However, following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 and the ensuing global financial crisis, there has been a significant 
amount of capital outflows10, resulting in a sharp decline in India’s FER, both real and nominal.  
 
Figure 2 in the following shows the ratio of FER relative to the GDP. The reserves–GDP 
ratio shows a similar pattern as the absolute amount of reserves: an continual increase, which 
partly echoes India’s economic growth over time. However, unmistakably, the ratio declines in 
the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis.  
 
In the new millennium, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) undertook a number of steps for 
increasing the flow of private outward investments in order to maintain macroeconomic stability, 
which helped the Indian corporate houses significantly (WIR, 2007). 
                                                        
10   Although the recent global financial crisis started with the busting of housing bubble in US, US 
financial markets continue to be of crucial importance to the rest of the world: More than $4 trillion of 
reserves are held in US currency. With global financial crisis, there is a ‘flight to safety’ and investors 
all over the world are buying US treasury bills even at near zero interest rates. Economists  argue that a 
lack of financial development at home makes foreigners keener to invest in America. What attracts 
them is the size, liquidity, efficiency and transparency of its financial markets compared with what is 
on offer in their domestic markets. 
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Figure 2: Ratio of Foreign Exchange Reserves to GDP 
 
 
Source : Drawn with data obtained from RBI (2009 -10) 
 
For instance, the 2003-04 budget of the Government smoothened overseas investment 
norms for corporate houses by allowing prepayment of External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) 
over US$100 million.11 In the subsequent period, the limit to overseas investment under the 
automatic route was increased from 100 percent of the net worth of the Indian entity to 200 
percent in April 2005 (RBI, 2006a). In June 2007, the limit of overseas investment was further 
increased to 300 per cent of net worth and further to 400 per cent of net worth in September 2007 
(Singh and Jain, 2009). Soon thereafter the RBI further relaxed the overseas investment norms for 
mutual funds and amended the remittance opportunities through various policies (RBI, 2006b). 
Subsequently, RBI has increased the overseas investment limit for the mutual funds to US$ 5 
billion from the earlier level of US$ 4 billion (RBI, 2009).  Moreover, the limit on overseas 
portfolio investment by Indian companies was increased by RBI from 35 percent of their net 
worth to 50 percent of their net worth in September 2007 (RBI, 2007). The Export Import Bank 
of India also supported more than 200 outward investment ventures by 164 Indian companies in 
over 50 countries (World bank, 2008). 
 
As a result of the reforms undertaken at home, the volume of outward investment flows 
has increased considerably over the years, which can be observed from Figure 3. It is learnt from 
                                                        
11  The Budget Speech of the Minister of Finance (2003-04), Government of India,  available at 
http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2003-04/bs/speecha.htm (last accessed on March 17, 2009). 
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the RBI documents that India's total investments in joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries 
(WOS) abroad reached US$ 23.07 billion (with 2261 proposals) in 2008 as compared to the 
corresponding figure of US$ 15.06 billion (with 1817 proposals) in 2007 (IBEF, 2008).  
 
Figure 3 : Comparing FDI Inflow and Outflow Figures for India (US $ Million) 
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Source : Calculated from the data provided in Singh and Jain (2009) 
 
Looking at the investment flows of the Indian private sector, it is observed that the 
investment flows has been directed towards energy sources, metal (e.g. - steel, aluminium), 
pharmaceuticals, IT, banking, industrial products etc., and spanned over various continents. 
Energy sector has been the major receiver of Indian investment till date. For instance, Essar 
Exploration & Production (EEPL) has recently bought two offshore petroleum exploration blocks 
in Australia, first time such initiative being shown by an Indian oil company (AGOCC, 2009).. In 
September 2007, Reliance Industries had bought a majority stake of East African oil retailer Gulf 
Africa Petroleum Corp (GAPCO), which owned and operated large storage facilities and a retail 
distribution network in several East African countries (IBR, 2007). In Latin America, 
Venezuela’s State-owned oil company PDVSA has recently entered into an agreement with an 
Indian oil company (Duarte, 2006). Moves to acquire stakes in the retail businesses of BP, 
Europe's largest oil company in Malaysia and Singapore has also been considered (Rai, 2004).  
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Apart from the private sector, the State-supported public sector has also played a key role 
in ensuring investment in energy sector. The Indian Oil-Oil India combine recently procured three 
onshore oil blocks in Libya, in addition to the two blocks they already were operating in (ET, 
2007). Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) Videsh Ltd (OVL) has won an oil block in 
Colombia through auction as part of a consortium (Pandey, 2008). The presence of Indian firms 
in Africa is also to be noted, as ONGC (24 percent stake) with Malaysian state oil firm Petronas 
(68 percent stake) got a $400 million agreement to develop Thar Jath oil fields in Sudan for to an 
initial capacity of 80,000 barrels per day (FE, 2005). 
 
One interesting feature has been the initial competition between China and India on oil 
exploration in Africa and Central Asia. China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) at one point 
purchased oilfields in Kazakhstan, Ecuador and Nigeria, where ONGC was also interested in 
getting into (CD, 2006). However cooperation between the two sides was noticed subsequently as 
in December 2005 companies from the two countries successfully bought the Al-Furat oilfields in 
Syria. Later the two countries attempted to finalize modalities of future cooperation between 
OVL and the CNPC, which may pave the way for joint biddings in future (Varadarajan, 2006).  
The presence of SWFs may come beneficial in that scenario. 
 
4.   Pros and cons 
 
India over the last few years have witnessed a stable macroeconomic regime until the 
recent global economic downturn and its growth scenario has been comparable only with China 
over this period. It is observed from the Economic Survey (2007-08) that while the annual GDP 
growth rate in 2002-03 was 3.8 percent, the same has consistently been over 7 percent for the last 
five years before the global meltdown. In particular the GDP growth rate during 2005-06 and 
2006-07 has been 9.4 and 9.6 percent respectively, the service sector being the largest contributor 
to this growth. This unprecedented growth scenario has fuelled both gross domestic savings and 
gross domestic capital formation (investment) significantly. While the gross capital formation 
expressed as a ratio of GDP has increased from 22.8 percent in 2001-02 to 35.9 percent in 2006-
07, gross domestic savings has increased from 23.5 percent of the GDP to 34.8 percent over the 
same period. The inflation fluctuated over this period, and increased considerably at times, but as 
a whole remained within controllable limits. The export growth rate however suffered to some 
extent in recent period, owing to the appreciation of Indian Rupee vis-à-vis the American dollar. 
This favourable macroeconomic scenario resulting the unprecedented level of FER perhaps 
prompted the Indian Government to think of a hitherto unexplored investment strategy for 
boosting growth rate further.  
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In spite of strong macroeconomic fundamentals, India's balance of payment on its current 
account has mostly been negative. However, following liberalization in the 1990s (precipitated by 
a balance of payment crisis), India's exports increased for some time, covering 80.3 percent of its 
imports in 2002–03, up from 66.2 percent in 1990–91. However as of 2008-09, the ratio stand at 
61.40 percent.12 At the same time substantial inflows of foreign capital in the form of FPI and 
FDI explains India’s unprecedented accumulation of FER buildup to the tune of USD 251985 
million in 2008-09. According to economists, there are usually two main motives behind such 
buildup: the precautionary motive and the mercantilist motive. According to the first explanation, 
like many Asian economies, following the East Asian currency crisis of 1997-98, Indian 
Government followed a protectionist approach to safeguard against a sudden shortages of 
international liquidity by accumulating a large volume of FER. The second explanation – the 
mercantilist motive – argue that India’s soaring reserves are an indicator of the country’s 
overdependence on trade and capital inflows as engines of growth (Park and Estrada, 2009).  
 
Following Park and Estrada (2009) one may use two measures of reserve adequacy to 
examine whether India has “too much” reserve buildup and hence ‘surplus’ reserves. One of the 
measure of India’s susceptibility to currency crisis is the ratio of reserves to short-term external 
debt. According to the so-called Greenspan-Guidotti rule13, the critical value of this ratio is one, 
with a value below one signaling danger. The rationale is that countries should have enough 
reserves to overcome a massive withdrawal of short term foreign capital.  
 
The second indicator of reserve adequacy is the ratio of reserves to M3 or broad money. 
This ratio is especially relevant for countries like India that are a haven for ‘hot money’ 
investment by large foreign institutional investors and hence are subject to a major risk of capital 
flight. The higher the ratio, the greater is the confidence of the general public in the value of the 
local currency and hence the lower the risk of capital flight from the country. Park and Estrada 
(2009) suggested a critical value in the range of 5 to 20 percent as a measure of reserve adequacy. 
 
Figure 4 in the following presents diagrammatic representation of inthe time-series value 
of the two ratios from 1990-91 till 2008-09. The diagram shows that India comfortably passes the 
                                                        
12   Calculated from India’s trade data. 
13  The rule is named after Pablo Guidotti – Argentine former deputy minister of finance – and Alan 
Greenspan – former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of the United States. Guidotti first stated 
the rule in a G-33 seminar in 1999, while Greenspan widely publicized it in a speech at the World Bank. 
Guzman Calafell and Padilla del Bosque found that the ratio of reserves to external debt is a relevant 
predictor of an external crisis, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guidotti–Greenspan_rule (last 
accessed on May 20, 2010).  
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Greenspan-Guidotti test of reserve adequacy as the ratio of reserves to short-term external debt 
exceeding one in all the years since 1991-92.  
 
Figure 4: Ratio of reserves to short-term external debt 
 
 
Source : Ratios Calculated with data obtained from RBI (2009 -10) 
 
Figure 5 exhibits that the ratio of reserves to M3 or broad money is above 20 percent for 
all the years since 2002-03. Thus a look at both these ratios indicate “too much” of reserves 
buildup for the Indian economy particularly since 2002, suggesting thereby that India has 
substantial amount of surplus reserves. 
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Figure 5: Ratio of reserves to M3 or broad money 
 
 
Source : Ratios Calculated with data obtained from RBI (2009 -10) 
 
Since 2008 the possibility of creation of an Indian SWF has been floated at times, 
although the same is yet to be constituted. The idea of strategic investments in overseas debt and 
equity markets has been supported on the ground that it will enable Indian firms in their 
acquisition drive on one hand and enable higher return on accumulated foreign exchange reserves 
on the other. The Prime Minister's Advisory Council on Trade and Industry has recently 
recommended creation of a SWF with an initial corpus of $5 billion (Choudhury, 2008). It has 
been argued that creation of such a fund would boost domestic economic growth (SWF Institute, 
2008). While the huge volume of FER has prompted the Council to come out with such a 
recommendation, the fiscal deficit (3.4 percent of GDP in 2006-07) and a widening current 
account deficit (1.58 percent of GDP in 2006-07) has perhaps prompted the Indian Government to 
move cautiously in this regard.  
 
Because of the democracy in India, the Government would be accountable for the fund’s 
performance and would face constant pressure of managing dynamic risks involved with a SWF  
(EL, 2008). The transparency and accountability that go with a democracy are not a convincing 
argument against having a SWF. Many democracies have very successful, accountable, and 
transparent SWFs starting with Norway, Australia, Canada, and the United States (Alaska).   
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The increasing inclination of India towards SWFs in recent period is becoming evident 
through the perspectives from the policymakers in different forums. Carl Linaburg, Co-founder 
and Vice President of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, noted that the Governor of the RBI 
has recently mentioned during a speech in Washington that India is indeed interested in creating a 
variant of SWF in coming future. It is expected that the SWF would function as a reserve 
investment corporation, and try to earn higher returns through diversifying into equity 
investments rather than lower risk investments such as treasury bonds (Linaburg, 2008). 
 
However, the justification of India’s recent inclination towards SWFs has been 
questioned by a section of professionals and economists. One major cost of reserve accumulation 
is that it is inflationary. When the RBI ‘issues’ domestic currency to purchase foreign currency, it 
increases the monetary base, which in turn leads to inflation. Although RBI use sterilization 
mechanism to neutralize such inflationary effect through open market sale of bonds, it puts 
pressure on interest rate and hence on Government’s fiscal prudence. 
 
It is argued that India’s achievements in terms of infrastructure, education, basic health 
care etc. are still innocuous as compared to China and other economies currently having SWFs. 
Moreover, the country possess a limited natural resource endowment and the current account 
deficit is quite high. In these circumstances, returns on well-picked domestic investments should 
match the same earned by corresponding SWF returns. It is also argued that the SWFs take time 
to mature in terms of investment decisions (IKW, 2008), and in the learning stage they are 
susceptible to mistakes just like the financial companies.  
 
India has however made its choice clear in recent period, when it decided to create room 
for investing the FER in infrastructure projects abroad. For this purpose, India Infrastructure 
Finance Company Limited has been set up as a wholly owned subsidiary in London in 2008. The 
subsidiary will borrow up to US $ 5 billion from RBI by issuing US-dollar denominated bonds 
and lend the resources to Indian infrastructure companies for meeting their capital expenditures 
outside India (Economic Survey, 2009-10).  
 
Another major criticism against the possible establishment of a SWF by India highlights 
the potential volatility of the FER and the global capital markets, especially in the face of the 
economic downturn. The investments in the global market in general are risky, and hence so 
would be the SWF investments. Moreover, the idea of floating SWF has been guided by massive 
FER in recent years. While the average annual FER growth rate was 9.66 percent over 1995-96 to 
2000-01, the same has increased to 30.15 percent from 2001-02 to 2006-07. Over 2001-02 to 
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2006-07, the FER has increased by more than 145 billion. Now if the global economic downturn 
continues and the FER stock depletes, the future of the SWF venture may not be very bright.  
 
ADB (2008) has noted that in the traditional SWFs, countries like Norway and the Gulf 
states have mostly invested their oil export revenues through the fund. On the other hand, the 
newly created SWFs in Asia (e.g. - China and Singapore) are mostly relying on conventional 
current account surpluses derived from non-resource exports for investment (Park, 2008). Given 
the fact that India’s current account balance is worsening for the last couple of years, it could be 
noted that Indian SWF would not belong to either group. On the other hand, the increase in 
India’s FER has been caused by speculative capital inflows on the capital account. Hence, it is 
argued that the amount needs to be considered as ‘liabilities’ created by sound domestic macro 
conditions and global liquidity boom and not a ‘sovereign wealth’. In other words, the reserve is 
very much exposed to potential sudden outflows by foreign investors and any decision should be 
taken keeping this perspective into account (Bykere, 2008).  
 
Apart form the economic criticisms, the possibility of the existence of SWF should also 
be understood in terms of the political scenario in India. The experience of Capital Account 
Convertibility (CAC) should be taken as a parallel here. The Tarapore Committee report on CAC 
in 1997 recommended introduction of CAC in India. However, the Southeast Asian crisis delayed 
the same. A decade after the debate on introduction of CAC was initiated by the Prime Minister 
of India, but the required policy change was not witnessed (Hindu, 2006). It is to be noted that the 
previously elected coalition Government was then receiving support from conservative Left 
parties. After completion of the recently concluded general election in 2009, the new government 
is not dependent on the left parties for support, and is in a better position to negotiate new 
financial policies. Hence, the idea of creating an Indian SWF may eventually materialize in 
coming days.   
 
5.   Possible characteristics of the Indian SWF 
 
Given the fact that the policymakers have expressed their willingness to realize an Indian 
SWF in recent years, three issues needs to be taken into account to understand the coverage and 
depth of a potential SWF in the future. The first issue would be the potential size of such an SWF; 
second, the investment strategies to be adopted by the SWF; and  finally, the management pattern 
of the newly created SWF.   
 
The first and foremost question in this subject is to determine the size of the proposed 
Indian SWF.   It is revealed from the reactions of the policymakers at various points of time that 
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the Government is considering creation of a SWF with an initial corpus of US $ 5 billion. 
However any final decision on that front is yet to be arrived at (SIB, 2008). Given the fact that 
currently India’s FER is about to touch 200 billion, the figure may look meagre in that 
comparison in isolation. However, it needs to be borne in mind that barely a decade back, India’s 
FER was around US $ 26 billion and in 2002-03, the same was around 75 billion. The spectacular 
growth in the FER has been witnessed only in the recent period fuelled by capital inflow. In that 
perspective, India should perhaps start with a modest initial SWF operation of US $ 5 billion and 
contemplate over the optimal size of it’s SWF a few years after the same is operational, based on 
practical experience (i.e., risk uncertainty and the size of returns).   
 
It is generally argued that SWFs intend to manage non-commodity based assets to 
increase returns on reserves. However, their investment decisions should be based on commercial 
considerations and not on geo-strategic reasons. Looking at India’s current outward investment 
trends, it could be ascertained that its SWF investment strategies might keep two considerations 
in mind: one, increased returns on reserves and two, ensuring energy security. Given the oil price 
trends in recent period, perhaps the two may not be completely uncorrelated from an Indian 
perspective. Hence, a proportion of the newly created SWF may definitely be utilized in India’s 
energy security quest. The other target areas might include iron and steel sector and other fields 
where the possibility of return looks higher.  
 
The management of SWF in the turbulent era of global slowdown has received wider 
focus in recent period. Linaburg (2008) has however argued that India is not a new player as far 
as SWF type operation is concerned. The country has earlier created the India Infrastructure 
Finance Company Limited (IIFC) in 2004, which provides long-term debt for financing public 
private partnership infrastructure development projects in India. The IIFC has the experience of 
raising money through equity finance, currency debt raised on the open market, debt from 
multilateral and bilateral institutions, foreign currency debt through external commercial 
borrowings etc. All these experiences makes IIFC an ideal body for managing the Indian SWF, 
once the same is established.  
 
              It is to be noted that the RBI has welcomed the idea of setting up of a SWF but is not 
keen to manage it. The argument is that the existing RBI mandate to perform as a Central Bank 
might refrain it from successfully managing the SWF type operation. It has recently suggested to 
the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance that a dedicated and independent entity set up 
by an act of Parliament instead would be the best forum to do so (Choudhury, 2008). 
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Given these circumstances, perhaps the best way of managing Indian SWF would be to 
follow the RBI recommendation, and the independent entity created for this purpose should be 
benefited from the experience of both IIFC and RBI. There should be executives from both IIFC 
and RBI present in the managerial board of the Indian SWF. The newly created entity should also 
have representatives from the Ministry of Finance and industry associations.   
 
6. Conclusions 
 
SWFs constitute an important element in the policy dimension of many countries that 
decided to set up such a fund. For instance in China, they are a key example of the interference of 
the Chinese government in business transactions and the private sector, which may not be present 
in the Indian case. However, as the earlier analysis suggests, there may exist a commonality of 
interest between the public and the private sector in India in terms of outward investment (e.g. – 
energy). In addition, it is to be noted that acquisition attempts in strategic sectors like steel by 
Indian private players have already been criticised in Europe (e.g. – Arcelor-Mittal takeover in 
2006) and any SWF operation in that area might also be viewed in that light. The analysis with 
Indian macroeconomic scenario indicates that creating an SWF and successfully managing the 
same may not be impossible for the country in the current settings.   
 
India however needs to keep in mind the management policies of SWF and the 
international norms. In October 2007, the G7 Finance Ministers invited major multilateral 
organisations, such as the IMF and the OECD, to launch a reflection on the role of SWFs and on 
the mechanisms to address the challenges they pose. Since the G7 summit, the activities in the 
IMF and OECD have been running in parallel but they are not dealing with exactly the same 
themes. They are however generally described as complementary. OECD has finished its work in 
2009, and the playing field has not been changed. The IMF agreed on a set of 24 voluntary 
principles for the funds to follow and to ensure their competitiveness in global financial markets. 
These Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) or “Santiago Principles” were 
released on 11 October 2008 and appeared in Annex 1. 
 
Complying officially with IMF guidelines should not require a lot of concessions from 
the Indian side. Since the Santiago principles remain quite vague and minimal, a good strategy 
would be to respect them and use these standards as a tool to ensure that Western countries will 
not create obstacles that run again the philosophy of this core of multilateral principles.  
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Annex 1: A summary of the 24 Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) 
 
 
 GAPP 1. Principle 
The legal framework for the SWF should be sound and support its effective operation and the 
achievement of its stated objective(s).  
o GAPP 1.1 Subprinciple The legal framework for the SWF should ensure the legal soundness of the 
SWF and its transactions. 
o GAPP 1.2 Subprinciple The key features of the SWF's legal basis and structure, as well as the legal 
relationship between the SWF and the other state bodies, should be publicly disclosed. 
 GAPP 2. Principle 
The policy purpose of the SWF should be clearly defined and publicly disclosed. 
 GAPP 3. Principle 
Where the SWF's activities have significant direct domestic macroeconomic implications, those 
activities should be closely coordinated with the domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to 
ensure consistency with the overall macroeconomic policies. 
 GAPP 4. Principle There should be clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules, procedures, or 
arrangements in relation to the SWF's general approach to funding, withdrawal, and spending 
operations.  
o GAPP 4.1 Subprinciple The source of SWF funding should be publicly disclosed. 
o GAPP 4.2 Subprinciple The general approach to withdrawals from the SWF and spending on behalf of 
the government should be publicly disclosed. 
 GAPP 5. Principle 
The relevant statistical data pertaining to the SWF should be reported on a timely basis to the 
owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion where appropriate in macroeconomic data sets. 
 GAPP 6. Principle 
The governance framework for the SWF should be sound and establish a clear and effective 
division of roles and responsibilities in order to facilitate accountability and operational 
independence in the management of the SWF to pursue its objectives.  
 GAPP 7. Principle 
The owner should set the objectives of the SWF, appoint the members of its governing body(ies) in 
accordance with clearly defined procedures, and exercise oversight over the SWF's operations.  
 GAPP 8. Principle 
The governing body(ies) should act in the best interests of the SWF, and have a clear mandate and 
adequate authority and competency to carry out its functions. 
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 GAPP 9. Principle 
The operational management of the SWF should implement the SWF’s strategies in an 
independent manner and in accordance with clearly defined responsibilities. 
 GAPP 10. Principle 
The accountability framework for the SWF's operations should be clearly defined in the relevant 
legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or management agreement. 
 GAPP 11. Principle 
An annual report and accompanying financial statements on the SWF's operations and 
performance should be prepared in a timely fashion and in accordance with recognized 
international or national accounting standards in a consistent manner.  
 GAPP 12. Principle 
The SWF's operations and financial statements should be audited annually in accordance with 
recognized international or national auditing standards in a consistent manner. 
 GAPP 13. Principle 
Professional and ethical standards should be clearly defined and made known to the members of 
the SWF's governing body(ies), management, and staff. 
 GAPP 14. Principle 
Dealing with third parties for the purpose of the SWF's operational management should be based 
on economic and financial grounds, and follow clear rules and procedures. 
 GAPP 15. Principle 
SWF operations and activities in host countries should be conducted in compliance with all 
applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the countries in which they operate. 
 GAPP 16. Principle 
The governance framework and objectives, as well as the manner in which the SWF's management 
is operationally independent from the owner, should be publicly disclosed. 
 GAPP 17. Principle 
Relevant financial information regarding the SWF should be publicly disclosed to demonstrate its 
economic and financial orientation, so as to contribute to stability in international financial 
markets and enhance trust in recipient countries. 
 GAPP 18. Principle 
The SWF's investment policy should be clear and consistent with its defined objectives, risk 
tolerance, and investment strategy, as set by the owner or the governing body(ies), and be based 
on sound portfolio management principles.  
o GAPP 18.1 Subprinciple The investment policy should guide the SWF's financial risk exposures and 
the possible use of leverage. 
o GAPP 18.2 Subprinciple The investment policy should address the extent to which internal and/or 
external investment managers are used, the range of their activities and authority, and the process 
by which they are selected and their performance monitored. 
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o GAPP 18.3 Subprinciple A description of the investment policy of the SWF should be publicly 
disclosed. 
 GAPP 19. Principle 
The SWF's investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in a 
manner consistent with its investment policy, and based on economic and financial grounds.  
o GAPP 19.1 Subprinciple If investment decisions are subject to other than economic and financial 
considerations, these should be clearly set out in the investment policy and be publicly disclosed. 
o GAPP 19.2 Subprinciple The management of an SWF’s assets should be consistent with what is 
generally accepted as sound asset management principles. 
 GAPP 20. Principle 
The SWF should not seek or take advantage of privileged information or inappropriate influence 
by the broader government in competing with private entities.  
 GAPP 21. Principle 
SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their equity investments' 
value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership rights, it should do so in a manner that is 
consistent with its investment policy and protects the financial value of its investments. The SWF 
should publicly disclose its general approach to voting securities of listed entities, including the 
key factors guiding its exercise of ownership rights.  
 GAPP 22. Principle 
The SWF should have a framework that identifies, assesses, and manages the risks of its 
operations.  
o GAPP 22.1 Subprinciple The risk management framework should include reliable information and 
timely reporting systems, which should enable the adequate monitoring and management of 
relevant risks within acceptable parameters and levels, control and incentive mechanisms, codes 
of conduct, business continuity planning, and an independent audit function. 
o GAPP 22.2 Subprinciple The general approach to the SWF’s risk management framework should be 
publicly disclosed. 
 GAPP 23. Principle 
The assets and investment performance (absolute and relative to benchmarks, if any) of the SWF 
should be measured and reported to the owner according to clearly defined principles or 
standards. 
 GAPP 24. Principle 
  A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP should be engaged in by or on 
behalf of the SWF. 
 
 
